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Why Inter-Agency Operations Break Down: U.S. Counterterrorism in 
Comparative Perspective 
 
Frank Foley 
Lecturer in International Relations, Dept. of War Studies, King's College London. 
 
 
Abstract. While U.S. counterterrorism has improved in many respects since the attacks of 
September 11 2001, there have still been turf battles and many cases of inadequate 
coordination between security agencies, which have had damaging effects on intelligence 
work and operations against terrorist groups. Why, more than fourteen years after 9/11, do 
U.S. inter-agency operations still break down in this manner? By comparing the United States 
with the United Kingdom, this article provides a new explanation for the deficiencies in the 
American response. It shows how U.S. inter-agency conflict has negative operational 
consequences and draws a contrast with the British security agencies, which tend to be more 
closely integrated and refrain from engaging in major turf battles. I argue that the differences 
between the cases stem from a combination of distinct institutions and different organizational 
routines in the U.S. and U.K. In the United States, divided national institutions and the 
informal routines of its security agencies have proved problematic for joint operations and 
intelligence work. The article also critiques some influential existing accounts of U.S. inter-
agency counterterrorism, which emphasize bureaucratic politics or organizational culture, and 
shows how such perspectives can produce unrealistic policy recommendations. A focus on the 
deep-seated routines and institutions of the United States leads one to be more sceptical about 
the prospects for meaningful organizational reform. 
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Many Americans have long been concerned that their national security agencies do not work 
closely enough together and that this problem can have fatal consequences. In the aftermath 
of the September 11 terrorist attacks, numerous political leaders, security experts and official 
reports came to the conclusion that various government agencies had significant prior 
information and leads on the 9/11 plot – but they failed to prevent it because of inadequate 
coordination.1 The U.S. government introduced a number of organizational reforms in 
response to this failure.2 It also went on to deplete the Al-Qaeda core, kill Osama Bin Laden 
and develop intelligence that enabled the prevention of many terrorist plots.3 Despite this 
progress, however, there were also several reminders of the ongoing problems in American 
counterterrorism. Experts and congressional investigations have highlighted inadequate 
coordination between security agencies prior to the 2009 Fort Hood shooting, the Christmas 
Day “underwear” bomb plot that same year and the 2013 Boston bombings.4 Why, more than 
fourteen years after 9/11 and despite significant government attention and reform, do these 
weaknesses in U.S. inter-agency operations and intelligence still persist? 
 Through a comparison of the United States with the United Kingdom, this article 
critiques existing answers to this question and provides a new explanation for the deficiencies 
in the American response, drawing on thirty-four author interviews and a range of primary 
sources. The article documents how inadequate coordination and conflict between security 
                                                
1 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on the Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), pp. 265, 267, 272, 276-77, 408; President 
George Bush, Speech to the Georgia Public Policy Foundation, September 7, 2006, available at: 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=759; Amy Zegart, “September 11 and the Adaptation Failure of U.S. 
Intelligence Agencies,” International Security, 29:4 (2005), pp. 78-111; Amy Zegart, Spying Blind: The CIA, the 
FBI and the Origins of 9/11 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007).   
2 See Zegart, Spying Blind, pp. 169-198; and below, the fourth section of this article. 
3 Frank Foley, ‘Counterterrorism and Intelligence’, in Gregory Moore (ed.) The Encyclopedia of US Intelligence 
(New York: Taylor and Francis, 2014); Erik J. Dahl, “The Plots That Failed: Intelligence Lessons Learned from 
Unsuccessful Terrorist Attacks against the United States,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 34:6 (2011), pp. 
621-648. 
4 Senate Committee on Intelligence, Unclassified Executive Summary of the Committee Report on the Attempted 
Terrorist Attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 (Washington D.C., May 18, 2010); Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security and Government Affairs, A Ticking Time Bomb: Counterterrorism Lessons From the U.S. 
Government's Failure to Prevent the Fort Hood Attack (Washington D.C., February 3, 2011); House Homeland 
Security Committee, The Road to Boston: Counterterrorism Challenges & Lessons from the Marathon 
Bombings (Washington D.C., March 2014). 
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agencies in the United States have had damaging effects on its development of intelligence 
and its operations against Islamist terrorist networks since 2001. The British agencies, on the 
other hand, have developed a more integrated approach to inter-agency counterterrorism and 
they tend not to engage in turf battles to the extent that their American counterparts do.5 To 
explain these differences between the American and British cases, I argue that a combination 
of two factors – state institutions and the organizational routines of security agencies – has led 
to the development of different approaches to inter-agency operations in each national setting. 
In the United States, institutional authority is divided between a range of actors including the 
executive branch, Congress, and state and local government. This has contributed to a 
proliferation of security agencies with overlapping jurisdictions, and a reliance on informal 
routines and relationships that often prove inadequate for the purposes of inter-agency 
coordination. In the U.K., a combination of centralized institutions and formal routines has 
proved more conducive for the development of coordinated inter-agency operations. 
 The analysis offered here challenges some beliefs that are widely held in both 
academic and policy circles. Officials and observers of the U.S. government often assume that 
inadequate coordination and turf battles are an inevitable, if regrettable, feature of the 
relationship between national security agencies.6 Theoretical underpinning for this view has 
been provided by influential models of bureaucratic politics, which hold that government 
agencies are strongly motivated by a commitment to their own parochial interests.7 From this 
perspective, clashes of bureaucratic interest make inter-agency turf wars a persistent and 
                                                
5 These findings complement those of Philip H.J. Davies, Intelligence and Government in Britain and the United 
States (Denver: Praeger, 2012).  
6 On this assumption, see ibid., pp. 11-12. For examples, see: Ron Capps, “Langley Won’t Tell Us: How I 
Fought the Intelligence Turf Wars – and Lost,” Foreign Policy, January 11, 2010, available at: 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/11/langley_wont_tell_us; Michael Sheehan, Crush the Cell (New 
York: Three Rivers, 2008), 175, 194.  
7 Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971). 
For discussions of how this model has been applied to U.S. and non-U.S. cases, see: Matthew Kroenig and Jay 
Stowsky, “War Makes the State, but Not as It Pleases: Homeland Security and American Anti-Statism,” Security 
Studies, 15:2 (2006), pp. 248-49; Klaus Brummer, “The Bureaucratic Politics of Security Institution Reform,” 
German Politics, 18:4 (2009): p. 503. 
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intrinsic feature of the national security landscape.8 But is this always the case? Are 
significant levels of inter-agency conflict really inevitable in the field of security? This article 
suggests that the answer is no. In some countries, such as the United States, we do indeed see 
agencies behaving as models of bureaucratic politics would expect. In other cases, such as the 
United Kingdom, however, there is a far lower degree of inter-agency conflict and a higher 
degree of coordination. We cannot account for this variation, I argue, without reference to 
institutions and routines. As fundamental features that appear in a variety of national settings, 
state institutions and organizational routines are analytically prior to bureaucratic politics, 
which appear in some cases but are largely absent from others.  
This article adds a comparative perspective to the ongoing scholarly and policy debate 
on the organization of the United States’ response to terrorism.9 To my knowledge, this is the 
first study to compare the causes and consequences of the U.S. counterterrorist system with 
that of another western democracy.10 The comparative method can offer additional analytical 
leverage, enabling one to better identify the precise conditions that have led to different 
outcomes across the cases.  
It is crucial for any national response to terrorism to have an effective coordination of 
operations carried out by the various security agencies involved in the mission. Indeed, a 
series of terrorist attacks carried out in 2015 and 2016 highlighted how the coordination of 
counterterrorism is a salient issue not only in the United States but also in France, Belgium 
and many other countries. “Coordination” here refers to the process of organizing people or 
groups so that they work in a mutually supportive way towards a common goal.11 Research 
indicates that inter-agency coordination is one of four elements that are particularly important 
                                                
8 Kroenig and Stowsky, “War Makes the State, but Not as It Pleases,” p. 249; Zegart, Spying Blind, p. 58. 
9 See above, footnotes 1 and 4, and the reports cited below in the Conclusion. 
10 This is notwithstanding Philip Davies’ insightful comparative analysis on a related topic: the broader 
intelligence systems of the US and UK. See Davies, Intelligence and Government. 
11 Aaron Wildavsky, Speaking Truth to Power: The Art and Craft of Policy Analysis (New Jersey: Transaction, 
1987), pp. 131-33. 
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for an effective operational approach to preventing terrorist attacks, the others being: precise 
and actionable intelligence; a robust but discriminate use of force; and international 
cooperation.12 Inter-service coordination is important for putting together pieces of 
information, which may be dispersed across the nation’s security agencies, in order to develop 
accurate intelligence on the overall threat and particular plots facing the country. Without 
effective coordination, there is also an increased risk that one agency’s actions may 
compromise the intelligence, military, or arrest operations of another agency.13 Finally, as 
Bruce Hoffman argues, counterterrorism strategy can only work if it utilizes in a coherent 
way all the elements of national power against the challenge at hand. “Success,” he writes, 
“will ultimately depend on how effectively the U.S. can build bridges within our own 
governmental structure and…improve the ability to prioritize and synchronize inter-agency 
operations.”14  
Full coordination may not be appropriate in every context. Public policy scholars such 
as Aaron Wildavsky and intelligence experts such as Gregory Treverton point out that 
duplication and redundancy may increase reliability and bring different perspectives to bear 
on a problem. Yet, as Treverton also points out, the kind of duplication that we observe in the 
U.S. case is not always this purposeful and is often wasteful and counter-productive instead.15  
I also recognise the inherent difficulty of preventing terrorist attacks. Terrorist 
operatives usually operate inconspicuously in small cells, they blend in with the general 
                                                
12 See Dahl, “The Plots That Failed”; Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison-Taw, “A Strategic Framework for 
Countering Terrorism,” in Fernando Reinares, ed., European Democracies against Terrorism: Governmental 
Policies and Intergovernmental Co-operation (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), pp. 7-22; Robert J. Art and Louise 
Richardson, eds., Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past (Washington, D.C.: United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 2007), pp. 563-96; Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End: 
Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida (Washington, D.C.: RAND, 2008).  
13 For example, an arrest operation by one service could halt the efforts of another to build a full intelligence 
picture of a terrorist network; or two agencies could both try to introduce informants into the same group, 
bringing a higher risk of raising suspicion.  
14 Bruce Hoffman, “A Counterterrorism Strategy for the Obama Administration,” Terrorism and Political 
Violence, 21:3 (2010), p. 370.  
15 Wildavsky, Speaking Truth to Power, p. 132; Gregory Treverton, Reorganizing U.S. Domestic Intelligence 
(Santa Monica: RAND, 2008), pp. 29-33. 
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population and do their utmost not to reveal their plans to others. Consequently, there are, as 
Paul Pillar puts it, some “permanent and ineradicable” limits on the ability of intelligence and 
security agencies to prevent attacks.16 Good coordination is important for averting some of the 
more avoidable errors committed by security agencies and increasing their ability to prevent 
terrorism. But even the best organized security response will never be able to stop all attacks. 
 This article examines domestic intelligence and law enforcement agencies with 
responsibility for combating terrorism on the national territory. There are two main reasons 
for this focus. Firstly, as Erik Dahl’s research has shown, domestic intelligence and law 
enforcement activities are key to preventing terrorist attacks against America.17 Consider also 
the nature of the threat. Britain has faced a significant degree of ‘homegrown’ terrorism since 
2003-04.18 In more recent years, U.S. citizens and residents have played an increasingly 
prominent role in Islamist terrorist plots against the United States.19 Responding to this 
evolution of the threat, the U.S. government has emphasized how the latest iteration of its 
counterterrorism strategy is the first one to “designate the homeland as a primary area of 
emphasis in our counterterrorism efforts.”20 While it was the domestic/foreign dividing line 
between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
that stymied efforts to uncover the 9/11 plot, the dividing lines between domestic agencies are 
of crucial importance in the current context. Given that most Islamist terrorist plots against 
the U.S. and the U.K. are being substantially prepared inside their respective homelands,21 it 
                                                
16 Paul Pillar, “Intelligence,” in Audry Kurth Cronin and James Ludes, eds., Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a 
Grand Strategy (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004), pp. 115-16. 
17 Dahl, “The Plots That Failed,” pp. 622, 627, 635. 
18 Frank Foley, Countering Terrorism in Britain and France: Institutions, Norms and the Shadow of the Past 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 28-32. 
19 Peter Bergen, Bruce Hoffman and Katherine Tiedemann, “Assessing the Jihadist Terrorist Threat to America 
and American Interests,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 34:2 (2011): pp. 65-101. 
20 Karen DeYoung “Brennan: Counterterrorism strategy focused on al-Qaeda’s threat to homeland,” Washington 
Post, June 29, 2011.  
21 Bergen, Hoffman and Tiedemann, “Assessing the Jihadist Threat,” pp. 67-69, 91-93; Risa A. Brooks. “Muslim 
‘Homegrown’ Terrorism in the United States: How Serious Is the Threat?” International Security, 36:2 (Fall 
2011): pp. 27-29; Foley, Countering Terrorism in Britain and France, pp. 29-31.   
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is important to study how domestically-focused security agencies work or do not work 
together to identify and combat such threats.22  
The United States and the United Kingdom share some important characteristics – as 
liberal democracies based on the rule of law – and they have both been facing a significant 
threat from Islamist terrorism. Among western countries, the U.S. and U.K. have been the top 
priority targets of jihadist terrorism for most of the post 9/11 era.23 Britain experienced the 
“7/7” London bombings in 2005, the killing of an off duty soldier, Lee Rigby, in London in 
2013 and several other substantial plots by Islamist extremists, which were foiled. In the 
United States, the Boston bombings and the Fort Hood and San Bernardino shootings caused 
death and injury, while a number of substantial plots have been intercepted.24 Overall, the 
U.S. and Britain have faced a broadly similar threat from Islamist terrorism during the period 
under study here.  
The United States’ national security bureaucracy is much larger than that of Britain. 
However, any argument that size explains the two countries’ records on inter-agency 
coordination does not hold up, especially if we expand our comparative frame of reference. 
Studies have shown how – similar to the United States – the coordination of inter-agency 
operations has been problematic in two other prominent cases: France and Germany.25 Yet 
both of these countries have national security bureaucracies of a comparable size to Britain – 
not to the U.S. If size was a key factor, we should not observe similar outcomes in America, 
                                                
22 The distinction between domestic- and foreign-focused agencies is not absolute. While the FBI’s main focus is 
domestic, it is also very active overseas. The CIA concentrates mainly on foreign intelligence, but it also 
conducts a range of domestic activities.  
23 Mitchell D. Silber, The Al Qaeda Factor: Plots against the West (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2012). France has also been a major target, especially in 2015. 
24 Brooks, “Muslim ‘Homegrown’ Terrorism,” pp. 27-29. 
25 Foley, Countering Terrorism in Britain and France, pp. 92-129; Julia Fleischer, “Coordination of Internal 
Security in Germany,” in Per Lægreid et al, eds. Organizing for Coordination in the Public Sector: Practices 
and Lessons from 12 European Countries (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 166-72. 
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Germany and France, with a different outcome in Britain. The fact that we do see such 
outcomes indicates that other factors are more important.26  
While the main objective of this article is to shed new light on a national security 
problem, the analysis also has broader theoretical implications. This is because the 
counterterrorist policy field can be seen as a hard test for institutional and organizational 
routine theories, particularly for their claim that historical legacies shape current policy in 
ways that reduce the likelihood of efficient outcomes. One might have assumed that such 
inefficiencies would have been stamped out more than fourteen years after 9/11 – given that 
the protection of citizens from Islamist terrorism is one of the highest priorities of the U.S. 
government. This has not been the case, however. Since a focus on institutional legacies and 
organizational routines explains much about how government performs, not just on low-level 
issues, but also in this top priority area of policy, I argue that the theories have passed a 
difficult test.   
The article proceeds in five steps. The first section critiques both bureaucratic politics 
explanations of security agency behaviour and a second widely used approach – that of 
organizational culture. I outline my alternative analysis in the next two sections, which 
discuss in turn the role of national institutions and the influence of organizational routines in 
the field of security. These two sections are structured similarly, each beginning with a 
theoretical discussion, followed by an outline of the relevant institutions or routines in the 
U.S. and British cases respectively. It is the interaction of these two factors, I argue, that best 
explains the performance of the two countries on the development of inter-agency intelligence 
and operations against Islamist terrorism. Evidence is presented for this argument in the case 
of the United States in the fourth section and Britain in the fifth section. The conclusion 
presents the implications of these findings for theory and practice, arguing that an emphasis 
                                                
26 See also Davies, Intelligence and Government, vol. 1, 9. 
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on institutions and routines offers not only a new explanation but also provides a realistic 
framework for analyzing the viability of proposals for national security ‘reform’ in the United 
States. The article draws on a range of sources, including author interviews with thirty-four 
current and former counterterrorist officials in the U.S. and the U.K. 
 
Beyond bureaucratic politics and organizational culture  
When asked to account for organizational problems in field of national security, analysts often 
refer to either the bureaucratic politics of security agencies or to negative cultural 
characteristics of these agencies. The most important proponent of the bureaucratic politics 
paradigm in recent decades has been Graham Allison, starting with his widely-read 1971 
study of the Cuban missile crisis, Essence of Decision. Though this work actually contained 
three models, it was Model III – “Government Politics” – that proved most influential.27 This 
model holds that government officials are “substantially affected by” the worldview and 
bureaucratic interests of their own particular department or agency.28 Drawing on Allison, 
Matthew Kroenig and Jay Stowsky write that government agencies are constantly seeking “to 
protect their own parochial interests” and maximize “their own autonomy, resources and 
prestige.” Applying this perspective to counterterrorism, they trace how the FBI and other 
agencies protected their own interests in domestic intelligence in the years after 9/11.29 In 
similar vein, Amy Zegart writes that U.S. national security officials engage in a “zero-sum 
battle for agency autonomy and power.” For her, this strong commitment to narrow 
bureaucratic interest partly explains the prevalence of inter-organizational conflict, the 
inadequacy of inter-agency coordination and the failure of the U.S. government to effectively 
                                                
27 David A. Welch, “The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and Prospect,” 
International Security, 17: 2 (1992), pp. 112, 120. 
28 Allison, Essence of Decision (1971), pp. 166-8, 176; Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of 
Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Longman, 2nd Ed, 1999), p. 307.  
29 Kroenig and Stowsky, “War Makes the State, but Not as It Pleases,” pp. 248-249, 259-265. 
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re-organize its intelligence agencies after 9/11.30 Yet, while such explanations capture some 
of the dynamics of government, it may be misleading to place them centre-stage in one’s 
analysis. A comparison of security agencies in different national settings reveals the 
limitations of a bureaucratic politics perspective. It cannot explain why organizations with 
similar bureaucratic interests do not act in the same way in the field of inter-agency 
counterterrorism. In particular, if the model was accurate, we should see Britain’s security 
agencies engaging in turf battles to maximize their interests. However, as a subsequent 
section of this article will show, we do not observe such battles.31 
 A second widely-accepted analysis is that the organizational cultures of U.S. security 
agencies are at least partly responsible for the outdated or ineffective aspects of their response 
to terrorism.32 Culture is usually understood to be the values, beliefs and identities of an 
organization’s employees. While these cultural analyses have offered useful insights into 
some issues,33 they have not provided a robust explanation for why inter-agency coordination 
problems persist in the United States. For example, in Amy Zegart’s analysis of the CIA, one 
of the main “cultural pathologies” identified is a “debilitating sense of agency parochialism,” 
according to which CIA personnel developed a strong sense of loyalty to their home agency, 
rather than to the intelligence community as a whole. Zegart argues that this parochial culture 
partly explains why some CIA officials avoided sharing information with other agencies prior 
to 9/11. In other words, inward-looking behaviour is said to stem from an inward-looking or 
parochial “culture”. This explanation conflates the dependent and independent variables. 
Similarly, “resistance to change” is identified as a characteristic of CIA culture and used to 
                                                
30 Zegart, Spying Blind, pp. 58, 98-99, 114, 153, 179-82. In a three-part explanation, Zegart argues that 
organizational culture and the fragmented federal government also contributed to these failures (see below). 
31 For similar critiques, see Davies, Intelligence and Government, vol. 1, pp. 11-12; and Welch, “The 
Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms,” pp. 128-30. 
32 On the influence of this concept, see: Hamilton Bean, “Organizational Culture and US Intelligence Affairs,” 
Intelligence and National Security 24:4 (2009), pp. 488-90. 
33 For an analysis of how the FBI’s law enforcement culture compromised its intelligence programme, see 
Zegart, Spying Blind, pp. 123-51, 189-193. 
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explain the agency’s failure to undergo meaningful change or reform.34 In these sections of 
Zegart’s analysis, it seems that “culture” is just shorthand for bad practices. Furthermore, it is 
not clear that the concept of organizational culture can help us to explain variation across 
national settings. Why does Britain have less coordination problems than the United States – 
because it has a ‘good’ or unified inter-agency culture? And what would explain why the 
culture of the British agencies is good, while that of the American agencies is ‘bad’ or 
parochial? Rather than focusing on broad conceptions of culture, it may be more fruitful to 
base our analysis on more specific concepts that have been developed in the literatures on 
institutions and organizational routines.  
 
How national institutions affect security agencies 
The next two sections will trace the relationship between the “macro” institutions of the 
nation state and the “micro” organizational processes of security agencies. I draw on the 
“institutionalist” literature, which argues that, at the very least, institutions can be understood 
to comprise formal rules and procedures, such as “the rules of a constitutional order” and “the 
standard operating procedures of bureaucracy.”35 One strand of the literature – sociological 
institutionalism – stresses how these rules and procedures are underpinned by legitimising 
ideas or norms.36 For example, as will be outlined below, the rules and procedures of the U.S. 
constitution concerning the separation of powers cannot be considered in isolation from the 
anti-statist ideas and norms of American society which underpin them. For the purposes of 
this article, institutions are defined as the formal rules, procedures and political norms which 
regulate the relationships between units of government (such as the legislature, executive 
branch departments, and state and local governments). 
                                                
34 Ibid., pp. 64, 67-68, 89-94, 104, 113-14. 
35 Peter A. Hall and Rosemary Taylor, ‘Political Science and three new institutionalisms,’ Political Studies, 44:5 
(1996), p. 938. 
36 Ibid., pp. 947-48. 
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Institutions are circumscribed by their historical origins. As Lynn Eden has written, 
the institutionalist literature “do[es] not assume rational, efficient or adaptive outcomes” but 
instead stresses “how older ways of understanding and acting persist” and shape 
governments’ solutions to the problems they face.37 Institutions thus develop in a “path 
dependent” manner, as Walter Powell explains: “Choices made at one point in time create 
institutions that generate recognizable patterns of constraints and opportunities at a later 
point,” he writes. Outcomes cannot be explained simply by “the preferences of actors… but 
must be explained as the product of previous choices.”38 Institutionalists analyze how such 
choices can become self-reinforcing and may even become “locked-in” or resistant to radical 
reform. Institutions can and do change but new developments will usually be broadly 
compatible with and follow the same logic as the existing institutional order.39 These 
theoretical expectations are well exemplified in the case of the United States’ political 
institutions. 
 
America’s anti-statist institutions           
The long-standing American suspicion of state power has a profound effect on its institutions 
of government. Anti-statism has been an important feature of U.S. political life from the 
foundation of the republic to the Cold War and the post 9/11 period.40 Reflecting this 
widespread wariness of the excessive concentration of power, the Constitution sets out how 
                                                
37 Lynn Eden, Whole World on Fire: Organizations, Knowledge and Nuclear Weapons Devastation (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2004), p. 51. 
38 Walter W. Powell, “Expanding the scope of institutional analysis”, in The New Institutionalism in 
Organizational Analysis, eds. Paul J. Di Maggio and Walter W. Powell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1991), pp. 188-189.  
39 Kathleen Thelen, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” Annual Review of Political Science, 2 
(June 1999), p. 386. While Thelen’s later work has a rather different emphasis – on institutional change – this is 
not directly relevant to the institutions and time period considered in this article. 
40 Aaron L. Friedberg, In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America's Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand 
Strategy (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000); Kroenig and Stowsky, “War Makes the State, but Not 
as It Pleases,” pp. 250-54. 
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institutional authority in the United States must be divided.41 Building on work by Amy 
Zegart and Martha Crenshaw, we may identify three types of division and decentralization in 
U.S. institutions that are particularly relevant to counterterrorism. First, regarding the 
separation of powers between the three branches of national government, Zegart has shown 
how the presence of a strong legislature, independent of the executive branch, means that the 
design and reform of national security agencies is subject to messy political compromises.42 
Second, as a federal union, the United States has multiple levels of government – national, 
state and local – which reflect the political importance of the states as well as a long-standing 
determination to forestall the development of an excessively powerful central government.43 
While the U.S. has a national investigations bureau – the FBI – it does not have a national 
police force partly because of fears that this would represent an excessive concentration of 
coercive power on the domestic scene.44 This power is decentralized rather to state and local 
governments, which have their own police departments. Apart from constitutionally-ordained 
diffusions of power, a third key factor is the tendency towards fragmentation even within the 
national executive branch. Responsibility for dealing with terrorism is widely distributed 
across the federal government to agencies such as the FBI, the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) and the Department of Defense (DOD).45 Indeed, there is a general tendency 
towards the proliferation of executive branch agencies in the field of security, whether it is 
America’s 16 intelligence services, for example, or its various federal law enforcement 
organizations.  
The divided nature of U.S. institutions has three effects of particular interest to us 
here. Firstly, the combination of federalism and a fragmented executive branch has produced 
                                                
41 Richard S. Katz, Political Institutions in the United States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 3, 9-
11. 
42 Zegart, Spying Blind, pp. 58-59, 172-182. 
43 Katz, Political Institutions, pp. 11, 35-6.  
44 Ronald D. Hunter, “Three Models of Policing,” Police Studies 13:3 (1990), pp. 118-124.  
45 Martha Crenshaw, “Counterterrorism Policy and the Political Process,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 24:5 
(2001), pp. 330-32. 
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a large number of domestic police and intelligence agencies with important roles in the 
American response to terrorism. Secondly, divided institutions have also led to a dispersion of 
authority in the field of counterterrorism. Thirdly, messy political compromises in Congress 
or between Congress and the executive branch have contributed to a situation in which the 
jurisdictions of security agencies often overlap or are unclear. Within the legislative branch, 
various congressional committees seek to maintain their own importance by ensuring that the 
security agencies and departments that they oversee play a role in crucial missions such as 
counterterrorism. This favours dividing such missions or creating overlapping jurisdictions so 
that multiple agencies and congressional committees all get a ‘piece of the action.’46 These 
three features of U.S. counterterrorism are considered in more detail below. 
 
Britain’s centralized institutions   
Britain has a more centralized set of institutions than the United States, organized around a 
powerful executive branch, which is usually supported by its majority in Parliament.47 Since 
1999, Westminster has devolved considerable powers to elected assemblies in Wales, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland, as well as to local government. Yet this reform did not lead to 
any major changes in the institutional structures and rules most relevant to policing, 
counterterrorism and national security.48 In the area of general law enforcement, there is a 
network of 51 police forces spread across Great Britain. However, counterterrorist law 
enforcement has long been organized from the centre by the London Metropolitan Police. The 
domestic intelligence agency, the Security Service – or MI5 – is responsible for developing 
intelligence on terrorist threats. Both the police and MI5 report to the UK’s interior ministry, 
                                                
46 I thank an anonymous reviewer for this point. See also Zegart, Spying Blind, pp. 58, 59. 
47 David Judge, Political Institutions in the United Kingdom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 24-31, 
79, 119, 163-220.  
48 One exception to this was the creation of a Mayor of London with some powers over the Metropolitan Police. 
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the Home Office, and there is little evidence in the British government of the kind of 
fragmentation that one observes in the American executive branch.49  
In the context of its more centralized institutions, Britain differs from the United 
States along three key dimensions. The number of agencies with important roles in the British 
domestic response to terrorism is lower than in the United States, while authority over 
counterterrorism in the U.K. has been concentrated in central government. Thirdly, in the 
context of a generally acquiescent legislature (unlike the assertive American Congress), the 
parliamentary majority tends to follow the government’s lead on security issues, avoiding the 
need for the sorts of political compromises that have led to overlapping agency jurisdictions 
in the U.S. We shall return to these three features of U.K. counterterrorism in the next section.   
 
The organizational routines of security agencies     
National institutions help to form the structures and routines of counterterrorist agencies. Yet 
these organizational routines also take on a significance and a momentum of their own, which 
has a major impact on the quality of inter-agency responses to terrorism. For James March, 
organizational action stems less from a logic of consequences (the considered weighing of 
alternatives, envisaged by rational choice theory) and more from a logic of appropriateness. 
This means that organizations tend to resort to pre-existing repertoires of action when they 
recognise a situation “as being of a familiar, frequently encountered, type.”50 Where 
organizational responses are marked by the appearance of such recurrent patterns of action, 
March considers them to be instances of “routinized” activity.51 Such organizational routines 
                                                
49 Judge, Political Institutions, pp. 117-62; Hunter, “Three Models of Policing,” pp. 122-3. 
50 See the “Introduction to the Second Edition” in James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations 
(Cambridge MA: Blackwell, 1993), p. 8. 
51 James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York: Wiley, 1958), p. 142. 
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are commonly defined as “recurrent interaction patterns” between multiple actors within and 
across organizations.52  
 Similar to national institutions, organizational routines tend to develop in a path 
dependent manner. Markus Becker emphasizes that while routines can change in response to 
challenges in the external environment, choices made in the past also have “feedback effects” 
which favour the continuation of certain routines and make the development of others less 
viable.53 Actors also tend to reproduce organizational routines in habitual and unreflective 
ways.54 Such routines are all the more powerful because they are not up for debate and are 
taken for granted in their particular contexts. It is through these path-dependent and habit-
based mechanisms that historically-grounded routines shape organizations’ responses to 
contemporary challenges.55 
Organizational routines are context-specific and may “strongly differ” across cases.56 
Considering the routines of counterterrorist agencies in various national settings, the key 
differences between them may be captured in the concepts of formal and informal 
organizational routines – two terms that have a specific meaning in the context of this study. 
In this article, a formal routine is indicated by the presence of regularized interaction patterns 
between agencies, based on rules laid down by a central authority. Conversely, an informal 
organizational routine is indicated by the presence of irregular interaction patterns between 
agencies, based on interpersonal relationships.57 I argue that the American counterterrorist 
                                                
52 Markus C. Becker, “Organizational routines: a review of the literature,” Industrial and Corporate Change, 
13:4 (2004), pp. 645-647. 
53 Ibid., p. 653.  
54 Organization theorists differ on whether actors reproduce routines in unreflective ways or as a result of 
“effortful accomplishment;” see ibid., pp. 648-649. The cases examined here tend to support the former thesis.  
55 Frank Foley, “Reforming Counterterrorism: Institutions and Organizational Routines in Britain and France,” 
Security Studies, 18:3 (2009), pp. 444, 457. 
56 Becker, “Organizational routines,” p. 651. 
57 Interpersonal relationships are important in all organizational settings since they facilitate smooth 
collaboration between individuals on particular tasks. The key distinction, however, is that the quality of 
interaction between entire agencies is dependent on interpersonal relations in an informal routines setting, 
whereas in a formal setting the quality of interaction between agencies does not depend on such relationships. 
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agencies rely for the most part on informal organizational routines, while their British 
counterparts’ routines are formal in nature. 
Macro institutions hold an important key to understanding why micro organizational 
routines may differ across national settings. As outlined above, national institutions have an 
important influence on three key variables; what we may call the antecedent structural 
conditions of organizational routines. These are (each followed by two ideal types): (i) the 
number of core counterterrorist agencies in the country (few/many);58 (ii) the nature of their 
respective jurisdictions (distinct/overlapping); and (iii) the distribution of authority between 
agencies (concentrated/dispersed). Variation in these structural conditions gives rise to 
different types of organizational routines, which in turn shape levels of inter-agency conflict 
and cooperation. The four stages of this analysis are outlined in Figure 1.59    
 
FIGURE 1: A model of inter-agency counterterrorism 
National Institutions           Structural conditions                Org. Routines                    Outcomes  
   (Centralized               (i) number of core agencies                (Formal /               Different degrees of co- 
     /Divided)             (ii) nature of jurisdictions          }        Informal)          operation between core 
                                     (iii) distribution of authority                                             counterterrorist agencies 
 
In the remainder of this section, I outline how the three structural conditions helped to 
shape the development of different organizational routines in the American and British cases.  
 
The United States’ informal routines 
The organization of U.S. domestic counterterrorism is complex and dispersed, with several 
core agencies playing a central role in the effort. While the FBI has “lead responsibility” for 
both counterterrorist intelligence and law enforcement, its jurisdiction over these areas 
                                                
58 By “core” agencies, I mean those agencies that have the authority and capability to play a leading role in 
domestic counterterrorist intelligence or law enforcement activities. 
59 This model draws on: Markus Becker, “A framework for applying organizational routines in empirical 
research: linking antecedents, characteristics and performance outcomes of recurrent interaction patterns,” 
Industrial and Corporate Change, 14: 5 (2005), pp. 823-827. 
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overlaps with that of DHS, DOD and state and local police forces.60 As noted above, these 
overlapping or unclear jurisdictions are sometimes the result of messy political compromises. 
Thus, in 2002, pressure from Congress led to the foundation of DHS, which was given a 
broad mission to prevent and respond to terrorism within the United States. The department 
was also mandated to develop its own Office of Intelligence and Analysis with 
responsibilities that overlapped with those of the FBI.61 That same year, Congress passed 
legislation that consolidated DOD intelligence activities under a weighty new position, the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. DOD units increasingly gathered terrorism 
intelligence within the United States, overlapping with the FBI’s intelligence mission. In 
2011, following a compromise between the legislative and executive branches, Congress 
mandated DOD to play a role in the detention of foreign terrorist suspects arrested in the 
United States, stepping this time into areas of the FBI’s law enforcement mission.62 Beyond 
the federal government – at state and local level – the police forces of large cities such as the 
Los Angeles Police Department and in particular the New York Police Department (NYPD) 
also have significant counterterrorist investigative units of their own with missions which 
overlap with that of the FBI. Overall, as Gregory Treverton has written, there is “confusion 
and ambiguity about the roles of particular agencies” and “uncertainty about who is 
responsible for what parts of the effort.”63 One bureaucratic actor at the centre of government 
– the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism – oversees 
counterterrorist policy and operations, but she lacks the authority to direct departments and 
                                                
60 George W. Bush, “Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5,” February 28, 2003, available at: 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-5.html 
61 Ibid; Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296, November 25, 2002, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/law_regulation_rule_0011.shtm, Sections 101 and 201; Zegart, Spying Blind, 
pp. 172-5. Initially given a different title, the office assumed this name in 2005.  
62 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Section 1022.  
63 Treverton, Reorganizing U.S. Domestic Intelligence, p. 26. 
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agencies.64 Authority over domestic counterterrorism is dispersed rather across the key 
agencies, most notably, the FBI, DOD and DHS. 
  The presence of several core agencies with overlapping jurisdictions, generally not 
subject to direction by a central authority, are conditions that have given rise to informal 
organizational routines between the U.S. counterterrorist services. A former senior DHS 
intelligence official illustrated this dynamic: “you do have, legitimately, FBI and DHS 
components all saying ‘We have the jurisdiction… to run that investigation.’ And really, 
they're all right. They’re all correct.” The response to such jurisdictional overlap, he 
explained, was to “rely on [interpersonal] relationships… you have to negotiate that stuff out, 
and what I tried to do in my job was have as many meetings and build as many relationships 
as I could across the country with state and local people, FBI people, National Guard people. 
You name it, I was out making relationships.” In order to work with other agencies, he 
underlined, “you gotta meet these guys and they gotta trust you… that you’ll protect their 
secrets and that you’ll help them as much as you can.”65 Though such efforts usually bore 
fruit, they also meant that interactions between the agencies often relied on ad hoc 
negotiations and thus did not follow a regular pattern. As one experienced FBI agent put it: 
“A lot of the way in which we work is personality-driven, and so, you could have a Special 
Agent in Charge [of an FBI Field Office] who has got a great relationship with the Police 
Commissioner of City X, but once of those guys leaves and they don’t like each other any 
more, the relationship could sour very quickly.”66 Also speaking about informal inter-agency 
relationships, a former senior FBI counterterrorist agent made a revealing comment: “those 
issues take vast quantities of energy to resolve everyday. It’s amazing the tending [to 
                                                
64 Project on National Security Reform, Towards Integrating Complex National Missions: Lessons from NCTC’s 
Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning (Washington, D.C.: February 2010), p. 9. 
65 Interview with a former senior DHS intelligence official [US-L], Philadelphia, September 14, 2009. The 
practitioners who were interviewed for this project requested that their statements should not be attributed to 
them personally, although most agreed that a description of their job could be included. 
66 Interview with an FBI counterterrorist agent [US-K], Washington D.C., December 11, 2008. 
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relationships] that is required, and if you ignore it or don’t tend to it appropriately, there are 
breakdowns, and then lack of cooperation.”67 Overall, there was a general recognition among 
the practitioners who were interviewed that U.S. inter-agency counterterrorism relies heavily 
on informal routines. 
   
Britain’s formal routines 
In Great Britain, from the early 1990s until 2006, responsibility for domestic counterterrorist 
intelligence and law enforcement lay with relatively few agencies: one domestic intelligence 
service – MI5 – and two branches of the London Metropolitan Police, which performed 
distinct missions. The police’s “Special Branch” gathered intelligence on terrorism, while its 
“Anti-Terrorist Branch” was responsible for law enforcement. The leading counterterrorist 
official at the Metropolitan Police is also the Senior National Coordinator of Terrorist 
Investigations and the London force has for decades had a mandate to investigate terrorist 
activity anywhere in Great Britain, supported by local police forces.68 A central authority – 
the government – issued clear guidelines to the agencies, which stated from 1992 that MI5 
was the “lead agency” on terrorism intelligence and that Special Branch’s role was to “assist” 
MI5 in this area.69 These guidelines also stated that Special Branch must provide all of its 
terrorism intelligence to MI5.70 While MI5 has primacy over counterterrorist intelligence, the 
agency has no competence in law to make arrests or do police-type investigations. 
Counterterrorist law enforcement is the exclusive competence of the British police. With their 
respective roles set out in legislation and government guidelines, the law enforcement and 
                                                
67 Interview with a former senior FBI counterterrorist agent, with secondment experience in the White House 
[US-P], Northern Virginia, September 16, 2009.  
68 Foley, Countering Terrorism in Britain and France, pp. 130, 160-61. 
69 Foley, “Reforming Counterterrorism,” p. 447. Outside London, a network of provincial Special Branches also 
had a mandate to gather terrorism intelligence, but their resources and involvement paled in comparison to that 
of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch. 
70 Home Office, Scottish Executive and Northern Ireland Office, Guidelines on Special Branch Work in the 
United Kingdom, March 2004, p. 8. 
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intelligence services working on counterterrorism in Great Britain have had a clear 
understanding of the division of labour between them over the last two decades.71 
Thus, in contrast to the U.S., Britain has relatively few core counterterrorist agencies, 
each of which has a distinct jurisdiction and operates on the basis of rules laid down by a 
central authority. These conditions have led Britain’s counterterrorist police and its domestic 
intelligence agency to adhere to a set of formal organizational routines, notably by developing 
procedures for regularized cooperation between their units. Whereas the interaction between 
the agencies in the United States tends not to follow a regular pattern, Britain’s MI5 and its 
police appear to begin with an assumption that their officers will be regularly doing 
operations together. MI5 desk officers have a mandate to task operatives from both their own 
agency and from police Special Branch. Indeed, MI5 and Special Branch agents have worked 
together even on sensitive tasks like the recruitment or handling of informants.72 When a 
particular case reaches a critical point, an Executive Liaison Group (ELG) of MI5 and police 
investigators is formed to make an operational decision on the case. Reflecting the police’s 
lead responsibility for law enforcement, the chair of the ELG is a police officer and it is the 
police who have the final say on whether, when and how the suspects will be arrested.73 As 
we shall see below, the formal routines of the British agencies were reinforced in the years 
after 9/11.  
 
Explaining levels of inter-agency coordination in the United States 
The next two sections will treat of the United States and Britain in turn, tracing how their 
divergent institutions and organizational routines have shaped the degree of inter-agency 
cooperation and conflict found in the two cases. In the U.S., significant coordination problems 
                                                
71 Foley, Countering Terrorism in Britain and France, p. 132. 
72 For details, see ibid., pp. 133-34. 
73 Intelligence and Security Committee, Could 7/7 Have Been Prevented? Review of the Intelligence on the 
London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005, Cm 7617 (London: TSO, May 2009), p. 8. 
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have affected intelligence work and operations against terrorism, according to several expert 
reports by organizations such as the Government Accountability Office, the Project on 
National Security Reform and the Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC).74 In a 2011 report, the 
BPC’s national security group, which is a follow-on from the 9/11 Commission, echoed a 
widely-held view when it identified an improvement in cooperation between the CIA and the 
military against terrorism. It cautioned, however, that “on the domestic side, there has been 
less unity of effort and much slower progress among multiple agencies...”75 Such assessments 
are borne out when we examine the relationships between arguably the four most important 
agencies in U.S. domestic counterterrorism: the FBI, DHS, DOD and the NYPD. This section 
considers firstly the relationship between FBI and DHS; secondly, the FBI’s interaction with 
DOD (including the case of the 2009 Fort Hood shooting); and thirdly, the FBI’s coordination 
with the NYPD (including their prevention of the Najibullah Zazi-led plot to attack New York 
in 2009). It will also assess the significance of post-9/11 reforms and improvements to 
information-sharing among U.S. agencies. The FBI’s prominence in the analysis reflects its 
role as the agency with lead responsibility in US domestic counterterrorism – but one that 
takes part in a complex set of relationships as several other organizations play an increasingly 
important role.  
 
FBI and DHS  
In the years following the establishment of DHS in 2002, its Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis (I&A) became a member of the US Intelligence Community and began working on 
domestic terrorism intelligence. The FBI remained the lead federal agency for terrorism 
intelligence within the United States. However, the broad and unclear nature of the DHS 
                                                
74 Government Accountability Office, Information Sharing Environment: Better Road Map Needed to Guide 
Implementation and Investments, GAO-11-455 (Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2011), pp. 2, 10-11, 14; Project on 
National Security Reform, Towards Integrating Complex National Missions, pp. 1-2.     
75 National Security Preparedness Group, Tenth Anniversary Report Card: The Status of the 9/11 Commission’s 
Recommendations (Washington, D.C.: Bipartisan Policy Center, September 2011), pp. 7, 11. 
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intelligence mission and its overlap with that of the FBI enabled the new organization to take 
an expansive view of its mission. A CIA veteran, Charlie Allen, was appointed head of I&A 
in 2005 and, according to a close colleague of his at DHS, “[Charlie] wanted to do 
everything” in the field of terrorism intelligence analysis, from “borders” to “prison 
radicalization” to “homegrown terrorists” and beyond. It was “a very big agenda.” Yet even 
as I&A moved into aspects of intelligence analysis traditionally conducted by the FBI, he 
admitted, “we didn’t have good connectivity with each other.” Sometimes “there was 
duplication of effort” between DHS and FBI which “could have been avoided if we’d had 
better cooperation.” He wondered “whether we were all doing the same things in a vacuum: 
whether we're working on a Somali issue for Columbus, Ohio; they're working on a Somali 
issue for Columbus, Ohio. So you've got two teams doing the same thing. Would it be better if 
maybe they can combine?”76  
            This duplication of effort was confirmed by one FBI counterterrorist agent, though he 
doubted the value of coordination with the DHS intelligence office: “[DHS/I&A] were trying 
to get their oars in the water in a way that I think was repetitive and actually hurt the mission, 
because people were spending time away from actually doing things to now having to 
coordinate with somebody who really had nothing, no value added.”77 At one point, some 
I&A officials felt that they were receiving insufficient information from the FBI, he added, 
and “there was a lot of animosity.” If they did get some information, they would “start 
digging along by themselves”, he said. When this intelligence work was presented back to the 
FBI, it would not go down well, according to the agent: “The FBI guy would [say], ‘well, we 
actually knew that. We’ve been doing this forever, you should have asked us to begin with, 
now please stop.’ There was still a lot of that going on.”78  
                                                
76 Interview with a former senior DHS intelligence official [US-L], Philadelphia, September 14, 2009. 
77 Interview with an FBI counterterrorist agent [US-K], Washington D.C., December 11, 2008. 
78 Ibid. 
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 Charlie Allen left his post at I&A in 2009 and though his successors may not have 
taken as expansive a view of DHS intelligence as he, the conditions favoring conflict between 
DHS and FBI remain. Unclear and overlapping missions mean that the two sides have 
different understandings of the appropriate division of labor between them in the field of 
intelligence analysis. A former senior official summed up the view from DHS: “they [the 
FBI] are a prosecutorial department; we’re not. We’re an intelligence department.” DHS had 
to remain engaged in mainstream terrorism intelligence, he believed, because it was more 
attuned to the need to build a broad intelligence picture than the FBI with its focus on arrests 
and evidence.79 FBI officials reject that characterization, pointing to their efforts to develop a 
fully-fledged intelligence program.80 From their point of view, the FBI is responsible for 
developing intelligence on terrorist trends and networks, while DHS (I&A) should 
concentrate on analyzing the potential for terrorist threats to expose vulnerabilities in the 
United States’ critical infrastructure, border security and other areas relevant to DHS’s 
component agencies.81   
 The FBI and DHS have also been at cross-purposes concerning who has primary 
responsibility for fostering cooperation between the different levels of America’s federal 
system. They do work together to produce joint intelligence reports and bulletins that are 
disseminated to state and local governments and police.82 At the same time, however, the two 
agencies are in charge of parallel networks that have a very similar raison d’être to coordinate 
information-sharing on terrorism between the federal and state and local authorities. Since the 
1980s, state and local police forces have increasingly participated in FBI-led Joint Terrorism 
Task Forces (JTTFs). Now existing in over 100 cities and states around the U.S., JTTFs 
                                                
79 Interview with a former senior DHS intelligence official [US-L], Philadelphia, September 14, 2009. 
80 See Gregory F. Treverton, Intelligence for an Age of Terror (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 
121-4; and Zegart, Spying Blind, pp. 189-93.  
81 Three FBI officials (US-K; US-M; and US-N) expressed this view. 
82 Interview with a senior DHS official [US-O], Washington D.C., September 28, 2010; Michael W. Studeman, 
“Strengthening the Shield: U.S. Homeland Security Intelligence,” International Journal of Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence, 20:2 (2007), p. 211. 
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enable joint investigations and intelligence-sharing on terrorism between federal and local 
agencies. A Washington-based National JTTF manages these local task forces and acts as a 
national focal point for terrorism information-sharing between operational agencies.83 After 
9/11, however, Congress also gave the DHS intelligence office a substantial mandate in this 
area. As its website proudly states, “I&A has a unique mandate within the Intelligence 
Community and is the federal government lead for sharing information and intelligence with 
state [and] local… governments.”84 Since 2003, DHS has also used its grant money to 
promote the creation of inter-agency fusion centres in states and cities, which perform 
information-sharing tasks some of which are similar to those conducted at the FBI-led 
JTTFs.85 The FBI’s level of engagement with these fusion centres varies considerably and 
only about one-third of the centres are viewed as effective.86 Asked about the various FBI and 
DHS-led networks, one FBI counterterrorist agent referred to them as “surreal parallel 
environments,” which were “very cumbersome and tiresome to deal with.”87 A former senior 
DHS official also acknowledged that these parallel networks “are at times very redundant.” 
There is, he said, “so much room for improvement” in this area.88 Rather than seeing it as 
purposeful, officials within the FBI and DHS view the duplication of effort and rivalry 
between their two agencies as a cumbersome obstacle to their development of terrorism 
intelligence.  
 
FBI and DOD    
                                                
83 FBI, “Protecting America,” https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism_jttfs.  
84 DHS “More about the Office of Intelligence and Analysis Mission,” http://www.dhs.gov/more-about-office-
intelligence-and-analysis-mission. 
85 Matt A. Mayer, “More Bad News for DHS Intelligence Capabilities,” January 7, 2010: 
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/192482/more-bad-news-dhs-intelligence-capabilities/matt-mayer.  
86 9/11 Review Commission, The FBI: Protecting the Homeland in the 21st Century (Washington D.C., 25 
March 2015), pp. 82-83, 97. 
87 Interview with an FBI counterterrorist agent [US-K], Washington D.C., December 11, 2008.  
88 Interview with a former senior DHS intelligence official [US-L], Philadelphia, September 14, 2009.  
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The Department of Defense has taken on an increasing role in the United States’ domestic 
response to Islamist terrorism since 9/11. Between 2002 and 2005, DOD expanded its main 
domestically-focused intelligence unit to 1,000 staff with the authority to give orders to a 
further 4,000 military investigators in the United States, making its potential counterterrorist 
investigatory ranks comparable to the FBI’s.89 The role of DOD domestic intelligence is to 
protect military bases in the U.S. from terrorist attack and conduct counterintelligence 
activities to safeguard the military from potential double agents or insider threats. However, 
this mission was interpreted broadly to include more general investigations into terrorist 
activity. For example, the Army’s 902nd Military Intelligence Group launched a programme 
under which its special agents and analysts gathered intelligence and made assessments on the 
general terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland from Al Qaeda, Hezbollah and other groups. 
Because of the U.S. system’s informal routines, the 902nd was able to take this independent 
initiative to carry out work already covered in depth by the FBI and other agencies at the 
expense of giving full attention to its own core missions.90 On the other side, the FBI has 
arguably been overzealous in insisting that it should have lead responsibility for investigating 
members of the U.S. military suspected of involvement in terrorism. As a Senate Committee 
report has detailed, DOD disputes the FBI claim and insists that it should have the lead in this 
area.91 These kinds of incursions across fuzzy jurisdictional boundaries had two negative 
consequences in the case of Army Major Nidal Hasan, an Islamist extremist who killed 
thirteen DOD employees and wounded 32 others at the Fort Hood military base in Texas in 
November 2009.    
                                                
89 Zegart, Spying Blind, pp. 183-4. The intelligence unit – Counterintelligence Field Activity – was merged into a 
new organization within DOD in 2008, the Defense Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Center.  
90 Dana Priest and William M. Arkin, Top Secret America (New York, Little, Brown and Company, 2011), pp. 
94-95. 
91 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, A Ticking Time Bomb, pp. 67-69.  
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 Firstly, the Army’s 902nd Military Intelligence Group – distracted by its ‘external’ 
activities – did not focus sufficiently inwards to detect Major Hasan’s radicalization.92 
Secondly, a lack of cooperation between FBI and DOD played a role in their inability to 
identify the risk posed by this individual. When Hasan sent several emails to a known inciter 
of Islamist terrorism, Anwar al-Awlaki, in 2008-09, the FBI decided to open an investigation 
into the army major. The FBI at that time tended to informally share information with DOD 
about such investigations into DOD employees (officials from both agencies work together on 
JTTFs around the country, and a later FBI review found that information about such 
investigations was shared in the vast majority of cases).93 However, these informal routines 
did not serve them well on this occasion because the FBI did not share its information about 
Hasan with DOD counterintelligence officials. This was a significant error, according to a 
Senate Committee investigation into the shooting, because DOD counterintelligence was 
better placed to evaluate the threat posed by its service member and would likely have 
mounted a deeper probe into Hasan at the very least as a potential espionage risk.94 Instead, 
however, the investigation wound down in mid-2009 without any action being taken against 
Hasan. 
 In the aftermath of Major Hasan’s attack on Fort Hood later that year, the FBI itself 
recognised that its coordination with DOD had been suboptimal. The Bureau introduced 
procedures to ensure that all of its counterterrorist investigations that implicated DOD 
employees would be communicated to DOD counterintelligence. FBI and DOD also signed a 
consolidated agreement governing their operational coordination.95 However, the Senate 
Homeland Security Committee expressed its ongoing concern in 2011, pointing out that the 
                                                
92 Priest and Arkin, Top Secret America, pp. 94-95. 
93 Webster Commission, The FBI, Counterterrorism Intelligence, and the Events at Fort Hood, Texas, on 
November 5, 2009 (July 19, 2012), p. 73; Senate Committee, A Ticking Time Bomb, p. 70. 
94 Senate Committee, A Ticking Time Bomb, pp. 10, 68-69.  
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information sharing failures in the Hasan case partly stemmed from the FBI-DOD dispute 
over jurisdictional boundaries, which remains unresolved.96 
Beyond the field of domestic intelligence, the U.S. Congress has sought to increase the 
role of DOD in another area that has traditionally been the preserve of the FBI. In December 
2011, the legislative branch passed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which 
included a law mandating DOD to take the lead role in the detention of foreign Al-Qaeda-
linked terrorist suspects arrested in the United States.97 President Obama reluctantly signed 
the measure into law as part of a broader compromise with Congress, though the White House 
believed that it was ‘ill conceived” and “remain[ed] concerned about the uncertainty that this 
law will create for our counter-terrorism professionals.”98 This uncertainty was illustrated by 
the then Director of the FBI, Robert Mueller, who warned lawmakers: “The statute lacks 
clarity with regard to what happens at the time of arrest.” He was concerned that the new law 
could create a situation in which “FBI agents and military [show] up at the scene at the same 
time on a [terrorist suspect]… with some uncertainty as to who has the role and who is going 
to do what.”99 Mueller’s concerns were addressed in February 2012 when President Obama 
issued a policy directive, which included extensive waivers to the NDAA’s requirement for 
military detention of foreign terrorist suspects, ensuring that they will continue to be placed in 
FBI custody in the vast majority of cases.100 The FBI remains in pole position in this area 
under the Obama administration. However, the law remains on the statute books and any 
future President or Secretary of Defense who is more sympathetic to the idea of military 
detention could interpret that law accordingly, opening the door for confusion and conflict 
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between FBI and DOD.101 The NDAA was a further example of how political compromises 
involving Congress create overlapping jurisdictions in law, which may in future require 
counterterrorist agencies to come up with informal work-around solutions or – if that is not 
possible – fight over who is responsible for what. 
 In sum, fuzzy jurisdictional boundaries and informal routines between DOD and the 
FBI contributed to deficiencies in their coordination of intelligence, most notably in the case 
of Nidal Hasan. Rather than clarifying their respective roles, changes to the law rather 
threatened to extend this confusion into another domain – the detention of terrorist suspects.  
 
FBI and NYPD 
After 9/11, the New York Police Department102 developed a major counterterrorist capability 
based around two distinct units – the Counterterrorism Bureau, which focused on law 
enforcement and specialized programs, and the Intelligence Division, which was charged with 
developing terrorism intelligence. However, during most of the period since 2001, the 
Intelligence Division did not participate in the FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) in 
New York. Instead, the two organizations have tended to develop their terrorism intelligence 
sources independently. One FBI agent said that in New York, there were “parallel 
investigations… all the time. I would say that is common.”103 The NYPD Intelligence 
Division has often been circumspect about sharing its information with the FBI. One former 
senior Bureau agent spoke of this in late 2008, more than seven years after 9/11: “They [the 
NYPD] have their own intelligence entity and they are running their own sources. And they 
are not telling. There is no sharing of that information. All done independent. So you’ve got 
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two huge, very good organizations stepping on each other.”104 NYPD intelligence agents have 
even sought to infiltrate some of the same groups being monitored by the FBI/JTTF and 
collect information in some of the same mosques, bookstores and other locations as the FBI 
without notifying the Bureau.105 This lack of cooperation has the potential to compromise not 
only the intelligence operations of the two agencies, but also their ability to intervene against 
terrorist suspects. In mid-2008, the NYPD did not inform the FBI that it was monitoring a 
suspect named Abdel Shehadeh until they saw that he was heading to John F. Kennedy 
Airport. The two agencies scrambled to respond but ultimately had to let a potentially 
dangerous man board a plane and fly to Pakistan.106 Some months later, the then Attorney 
General, Michael Mukasey, wrote to the head of the NYPD, Ray Kelly, that such 
“documented failure[s] of the NYPD… to share information in a timely manner… are 
unacceptable and make New York and the country less safe.”107 
 The FBI and NYPD’s Counterterrorism Bureau do work together on many 
investigations and have assigned almost 150 detectives each to the New York JTTF.108 
Despite this commitment, problems have also arisen here because of their failure to fully 
coordinate operational decisions on some cases. The inquiry into U.S. resident, Najibullah 
Zazi, is often praised as an example of good inter-agency cooperation and it did involve 
effective coordination of foreign intelligence with a domestic investigation.109 Yet even this 
good example had revealing shortcomings. In September 2009, the FBI was following Zazi as 
he drove towards New York with what agents believed were explosive materials in the trunk 
of his car. At a bridge leading into New York City, the FBI used Port Authority police to stop 
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Zazi for a ‘random search’ but their sniffer dog failed to detect the materials, leaving police 
without a pretext to open his trunk and so they left him on his way. The fact that the FBI had 
used the Port Authority rather than NYPD angered the latter and soon the police department 
was taking its own initiatives on the case.110 The Intelligence Division began asking their 
sources about Zazi, including an imam, Ahmad Afzali, who proceeded to inform the suspect 
by phone that law enforcement were onto him. FBI and NYPD officials have blamed each 
other both anonymously and publicly in the press for tipping off Zazi.111 In any case, by this 
time, he had jettisoned his bomb-making materials and was soon taken in for questioning. As 
later court cases would show, a significant plot had been foiled but in a haphazard way which 
cut short efforts to develop intelligence on Zazi’s network and allowed any co-conspirators 
ample opportunity to flee.112 Indeed FBI officials stated that they would have preferred to 
monitor Zazi and others for longer to gather further intelligence but could not because of the 
NYPD intervention.113 Independent initiatives on both sides and a failure to cooperate on 
operational decision-making contributed substantially to this suboptimal outcome.  
In sum, separate lines of responsibility at federal and state level and the lack of a 
central authority for counterterrorism gives the NYPD and the FBI freedom to informally 
implement both general policies and specific operational decisions without consulting each 
other – a pattern that led to conflict and confusion between the two sides. Such informal 
organizational routines, which enable rapid and nimble action, can certainly be a strength in 
counterterrorism.114 However, when informal routines and relationships are relied upon to 
manage inter-agency coordination, it rarely proves a sustainable solution. According to a then 
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Deputy Commissioner of the NYPD, Michael Sheehan, the FBI-NYPD conflict reached a 
high point in early 2006. Later that year, however, when the FBI appointed Joe Demarest as 
head of the New York JTTF, cooperation “improved dramatically” due to his leadership style 
and good personal relationship with the NYPD Commissioner, Ray Kelly.115 Yet when 
Demarest left the FBI in early 2008, relations deteriorated as a dispute between federal 
officials and the NYPD over the latter’s approach to electronic surveillance was revealed in 
the press.116 Demarest was brought back to the New York Field Office in December of that 
year partly to patch up relations. He had some success in this endeavour, but when he was 
transferred to FBI HQ in Washington D.C. in 2010, conflicts broke out again. In one joint 
investigation, the NYPD unilaterally sought a search warrant without informing the FBI, 
leading an angry Bureau to halt information-sharing with the NYPD Intelligence Division and 
suspend meetings of their JTTF for a period.117 One former senior FBI agent reflected the 
Bureau’s irritation when he told me: “the NYPD is a sort of in-your-face type of thing, and its 
infuriating what they do, how they treat the FBI Field Office.”118 During 2012-13, complaints 
about deficient information-sharing were once again being aired in the press.119 By 2015-16, 
however, changes of personnel at the top of the NYPD and the FBI’s New York Field Office 
led to improvements in the exchange of information between the two sides.120 Nevertheless, 
previous experience indicated that relations could again turn sour when the key personalities 
moved on. Overall, conflicts and inadequate coordination between the FBI and the NYPD in 
the post-9/11 era have been “serious enough to affect operations,” according to Michael 
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Sheehan, hampering intelligence-development and allowing terrorist suspects to flee notably 
in the Zazi and Shehadeh cases.121   
 
Formal coordination through NCTC 
If Congress’ substantial involvement in national security often leads to confusion over agency 
missions, the activist legislature and political class in the United States has also been a 
significant driver of reform, including the introduction of some formal coordination 
mechanisms into American counterterrorism. The creation of the National Counterterrorism 
Center (NCTC) in 2004 was one of the main reforms driven by the 9/11 Commission and 
Congress aimed at improving inter-agency coordination in response to the organizational 
failures that preceded 9/11.122 NCTC brings together representatives from the United States’ 
various counterterrorist agencies for regular meetings in which they pool their information on 
terrorism. The centre also produces “all-source” analyses of the threat, which aim to integrate 
all terrorism-related intelligence possessed by U.S. government departments, agencies and 
intelligence organizations.123 NCTC is widely considered to have added value in these areas. 
As one senior FBI intelligence official put it: “on threat analysis and information-sharing, I 
think they do a pretty good job, and most people here [at the FBI], including the Director, 
would say that.” NCTC has direct access to the databases of the FBI and other agencies, the 
official explained: “We’re not only giving it to them… they can draw it out themselves.”124 
These procedures for automatic information-sharing with NCTC, along with the regular inter-
agency meetings at the centre, indicate how the introduction of formal organizational routines 
can strengthen coordination.  
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The second key mission of NCTC concerns strategic operational planning; that is the 
assigning of specific roles in counterterrorism to U.S. government agencies. NCTC negotiated 
with the various agencies over ten months in 2005-06 to produce a National Implementation 
Plan (NIP) for counterterrorism.125 “There was a lot of wailing and gnashing of teeth,” 
recalled one former senior NCTC official, as agencies sought to maintain their prerogatives. 
Ultimately, NCTC lacked the authority to ensure that the agencies implemented the plan. The 
former official admitted: “I’m not certain how well [the NIP] has been followed 
subsequently.” He also pointed out that NCTC does not direct tactical-level intelligence, law 
enforcement or military operations: “we were almost like air traffic controllers. We weren’t 
operational. We didn’t tell them: ‘You should do this. You should do that.’”126 While NCTC 
has added value in some areas, it does not have major authority or an operational role, nor has 
it changed the overall nature of U.S. inter-agency counterterrorism, which retains its reliance 
on informal routines.   
Overlapping missions and informal organizational routines create a fluid situation in 
which agencies can take independent actions without necessarily consulting their peers or a 
superior central authority. DHS took initiatives after its foundation, which the FBI reacted 
angrily to, leading to rivalry and duplication of effort, which both sides view as an obstacle to 
their development of terrorism intelligence. Fuzzy jurisdictional boundaries between DOD 
and the FBI contributed to deficiencies in their intelligence work. The NYPD also developed 
its activities independently of the FBI, with negative operational consequences in a number of 
instances. These case studies show how inadequate coordination and conflict between 
domestic security agencies have had damaging effects on the United States’ development of 
intelligence and its operations against Islamist terrorist networks. 
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Explaining inter-agency coordination in Britain127 
In contrast to the U.S. case, the U.K.’s security agencies have tended to closely integrate their 
activities and refrain from turf battles. An analysis of MI5’s relationships with various police 
units shows that this higher degree of coordination owes much to the formal organizational 
routines of the British agencies. 
 
MI5 and the London Metropolitan Police 
During the 1990s, the missions of Britain’s three core domestic counterterrorist agencies were 
shaped by a sharp distinction between intelligence and evidence. MI5 devoted itself to 
collecting intelligence; the law enforcement officers of the Metropolitan Police Anti-Terrorist 
Branch (ATB) worked purely on gathering evidence that could be admitted to court; and 
Metropolitan Police Special Branch straddled the line between the two, linking intelligence to 
evidence-development.128 After 9/11, however, facing a perceived threat of mass-casualty 
terrorism, the ATB police began arresting suspects earlier in the inquiry process than they had 
in the past (when they had faced the Irish Republican Army). In this context, the Anti-
Terrorist Branch began to work more intensively with MI5 early on in particular cases to 
facilitate the assembly of evidence and enable consequent arrests. Senior ATB law 
enforcement officers, such as Peter Clarke, confirmed that they were now working with MI5 
at an earlier stage of inquiries and were being given greater access to sensitive intelligence 
than they had previously.129 “Operation Crevice” in 2004 was a significant example of the 
ATB being involved at an earlier stage of an inquiry as it worked with MI5 to gather evidence 
for two months before the suspects were arrested.130 MI5 also developed its role, playing a 
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greater part in the provision of evidence for trial, alongside its traditional intelligence-
gathering function.131  
 MI5 and the ATB were now working directly together on linking intelligence to 
evidence-development. In effect, they were carrying out the role traditionally fulfilled by 
Metropolitan Police Special Branch. In this context, the Metropolitan Police decided to merge 
Special Branch with the ATB into a reformed division called the Counter Terrorism 
Command, which would bring together in one agency the traditional métiers of the two old 
branches: intelligence and law enforcement. Peter Clarke, then the leading officer at the ATB, 
was appointed head of the new CT Command, which was launched in October 2006.132 The 
Metropolitan Police Special Branch was one of Britain’s two major police counterterrorist 
units, with a good reputation in police circles internationally and a history of operations that 
stretched back to the 19th century. Aware of the significance of their organization, some 
Special Branch officers were unhappy when they learned that it was to be closed down and its 
personnel absorbed into a new agency.133 Nevertheless, no major conflict ensued between 
Special Branch and the other agencies. Two factors help to explain why. 
Firstly, we need to understand how the UK’s formal organizational routines – which 
involve distinct missions for each agency, laid out in government guidelines – have fostered 
stable expectations among the counterterrorist services. As noted above, these government 
guidelines have specified since the early 1990s that Special Branch’s role was to “assist” 
MI5’s work on terrorism intelligence. In this context, there has been an expectation among 
Special Branch officers in recent decades that MI5’s role in terrorism intelligence would 
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continue to be enhanced – at their expense.134 As the ultimate outcome of what one senior 
police officer called a set of “incremental changes,” the decision to put an end to Special 
Branch as a distinct entity was wholly in tune with the established trend.135 Secondly, the 
impact of this change was also softened by the overall balance that the UK’s reforms 
maintained between the roles of the intelligence and police agencies. Since 2004, the 
government has allocated funding to more than double the staff of both MI5 and of the 
police’s main counterterrorism entities.136 While such expansions may encourage mission 
grabs in some countries, the core counterterrorist agencies in Britain have less room to take 
such initiatives because each service has a distinct and well-insulated mandate. MI5 has a 
clear lead on the intelligence mission while the police maintains responsibility for law 
enforcement. 
Formal organizational routines thus reduce the likelihood that agencies will take rapid 
or independent initiatives, which can provoke conflict between them and other services, as we 
have seen in the U.S. case. In Britain, rather, changes were introduced incrementally either by 
the central government or with their support. The Metropolitan Police’s decision to close 
Special Branch was congruent with both contemporaneous and previous changes approved by 
the British government to promote MI5 primacy on terrorism intelligence. With a central 
authority supporting these developments, the British reforms maintained clear lines of 
responsibility and a balance between the roles of the police and intelligence services. In this 
context, the core agencies continued and, in some respects, intensified their close and 
regularized cooperation on counterterrorism. The government and agency leaderships were 
the key decision-makers in the British reforms with Parliament taking a back seat, in contrast 
to the United States where Congress played an active role in national security reform. 
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MI5 and regional police 
While the British agencies foiled several substantial terrorist plots in the post 9/11 era, their 
failure to prevent 2005 London bombings revealed deficiencies.137 MI5 had strengthened its 
relationship with the London Metropolitan Police, as outlined above, but it was not sharing 
sensitive terrorism intelligence with provincial police forces to the same extent.138 Some 
analysts believed that this contributed to the agencies’ failure to detect the London bombers’ 
attack plans in advance.139 At the same time, intelligence was uncovering a growing Islamist 
terrorist threat in certain regions of the UK, which local police forces were ill-equipped to 
deal with. In this context, both the police and MI5 were given funding from 2006-07 to create 
significant regional counterterrorism units or stations.140 Several sources indicate that this has 
improved MI5’s operational co-ordination with regional and provincial police forces. The 
inquest into the London bombings by Lady Justice Hallett, which was highly critical of MI5 
in some areas, concluded in respect of this issue that “on the evidence, the gathering of 
intelligence around the country and the liaison between the Security Service and the various 
police forces has changed beyond recognition and brought with it considerable benefits.”141 
As an example of this liaison, the then head of MI5, Eliza Manningham-Buller, told of how 
her service’s regional station in the Midlands had worked with the regional police’s Counter 
Terrorism Unit and others on a sensitive operation in 2007, which disrupted a plot to kidnap 
and kill a British soldier: “It is clear to me that having an established [MI5] station in [the 
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West Midlands] that is able to work very closely with both the Special Branch and the CT 
unit in [the West Midlands] on this case is extremely helpful…”142  
UK counterterrorism has departed from its centralized model to some extent with the 
introduction of regional police Counter Terrorism Units. However, these reforms have also 
provided for central control of the new regional units and introduced common procedures to 
ensure interoperability between them.143 The London Metropolitan Police and MI5 remain the 
key actors and they have retained their authority to direct counterterrorism operations 
throughout Great Britain. Inter-agency coordination in the UK is not without its problems. A 
parliamentary report in 2014 recommended that the police and MI5 should work closer 
together to bring ordinary criminal charges against people that they suspect, but have 
insufficient intelligence, of being linked to terrorism. The agencies considered bringing drug 
charges in 2012 against a man who went on to kill Lee Rigby the following year, but they did 
not give it sufficient priority to make a successful disruption.144 Notwithstanding this flaw, 
however, it is clear that the British agencies overall have considerably less coordination 
problems and turf conflicts than their U.S. counterparts. 
 
Implications for Theory and Policy 
In the United States’ domestic response to Islamist terrorism, there has been considerable 
conflict between core agencies such as the FBI, DHS, DOD and the NYPD, while their 
reliance on informal inter-agency ties has had negative operational consequences. The more 
formal arrangements of the British case have led to higher levels of inter-agency cooperation 
on counterterrorist intelligence and law enforcement operations and little conflict between 
core organizations. To explain this variation, we have shown how an interaction between 
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macro-institutions and micro-organizational routines shapes the development of intelligence 
and operations against terrorism within the United States and Britain respectively. These 
findings have implications for both theory and policy. 
The findings raise questions about the ability of some influential theoretical paradigms 
to shed light on the dynamics of security organizations. From a bureaucratic politics 
perspective, security agencies in Britain and the U.S. may be assumed to have a similar 
interest in maximizing their autonomy and sphere of activity. If this is the case, however, the 
model cannot explain the variation in levels of inter-agency cooperation between the two 
cases, nor does it shed light on why turf battles are prevalent in the U.S. but rare in Britain 
even when agencies’ bureaucratic interests are severely threatened as in the case of Special 
Branch. Rather than placing interests at the centre of the analysis, it is more fruitful to 
examine the jurisdictional boundaries between security agencies (whether they are distinct or 
overlapping). It is equally important to focus on how informal organizational routines enable 
individual agencies to take rapid and independent initiatives, which are more likely to cause 
conflict and stymie cooperation than changes that are introduced incrementally with the 
support of a central authority.  
 Routines are sometimes linked to, or seen as a component part of, organizational 
culture.145 In this sense, my conclusions build on and are complementary to cultural studies. 
Nevertheless, this article has suggested that a focus on organizational routines offers more 
specific mechanisms than culture for the analyst to examine. It has specified three 
institutionally-based structural conditions, which shape the formation of these routines. This 
interaction between national institutions and specific organizations is worthy of further study. 
As argued above, since institutional and organizational routine theories can explain how 
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historical legacies lead to sub-optimal practices – even in a top priority area such as 
counterterrorist policy – these theories have passed a difficult test.  
 Turning to policy implications, this study identifies certain key conditions for the 
development of a high level of inter-agency cooperation on counterterrorist intelligence and 
law enforcement operations. The presence of few core counterterrorist agencies, whose work 
is regulated by distinct missions and clear guidelines laid down by a central authority, has 
been found to give rise to formal organizational routines (see Figure 1). These routines entail 
regularized interaction between services and favour the development of a relatively high level 
of cooperation between core organizations. All of the conditions leading to this outcome were 
present in the British case and absent in the American case.146 It may be useful for U.S. 
policymakers to take these conditions into account when making future alterations to the 
agencies; for example, the importance of giving distinct missions to security organizations. 
Furthermore, the record of NCTC shows how formal routines and coordination mechanisms 
can be introduced into parts of the system in a way that brings concrete benefits. Some degree 
of reform to the coordination of U.S. counterterrorism is possible.  
However, the analysis offered in this article also highlights the severe constraints on 
reform and indicates why more substantial changes to the coordination of U.S. 
counterterrorism have not been introduced. For example, some expert panels have made 
proposals for a moderate centralization of U.S. counterterrorism, in which the President of the 
United States would “empower” NCTC to “serve as an integrating mechanism for CT in the 
U.S government.”147 From this perspective, if clashing bureaucratic interests are a key driver 
of inter-agency turf wars and coordination problems, then what is needed is stronger direction 
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from the top. However, such proposals encounter a formidable obstacle in the American 
suspicion of concentrated power. This anti-statist impulse is so pervasive that it is even 
expressed by high-level security officials who one might have expected to be sympathetic to 
some degree of centralization. A former senior NCTC official spoke of inter-agency 
coordination problems that he had personally witnessed, adding: 
 “But that’s the way we are in this country. We decided long ago, we’re not gonna 
have… concentrated power… This country is much more comfortable with a fragmented 
[law] enforcement and intelligence system. That comes with a cost: conflicting operations and 
conflicting analysis and everything else. But we have decided that we’d rather have that than 
have a KGB.”148  
 
In the context of such attitudes, anything that smacks of centralization is likely to face 
rigorous opposition.149  
Even if these obstacles could be overcome and a moderate centralization of U.S. 
counterterrorism was introduced, my analysis suggests that it would not make a great deal of 
difference to operational coordination. The informal routines of the U.S. agencies have, over 
time, taken on significant momentum and staying-power. As noted above, the theoretical 
literature on the subject indicates that organizational routines are taken for granted in their 
particular contexts and tend to be reproduced in unreflective ways. Cross-jurisdictional 
incursions and turf battles have become routine and expected behaviours among U.S. security 
agencies. It would take more than a moderate increase in central authority to change these 
deeply-embedded organizational routines. In American politics and society, however, a more 
than moderate centralization is unlikely to be acceptable. 
A second idea for reform is that policies designed to alter the incentive structure of 
security officials might reduce their focus on their own agency’s bureaucratic interest. For 
example, Amy Zegart has suggested making rotational assignments to other agencies a 
requirement for promotion. She argues that this would create incentives and opportunities to 
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establish informal networks and build trust between officials across agencies.150 It is true that 
good relations between individuals can improve inter-agency cooperation for a certain period, 
as was outlined in the FBI-NYPD case above. Yet, as this example also showed, such 
informal links and routines do not provide a sustainable solution to the problems of inter-
agency coordination and conflict over turf. 
These and other reform proposals are influenced by the widespread assumption that 
bureaucratic self-interest is a key driver of deficiencies in inter-agency coordination. Perhaps 
surprisingly, it turns out that this assumption leads to overly optimistic conclusions. A 
comparison of the United States with the British case, focused on their deep-seated routines 
and institutions, leads one to be more doubtful about the prospects for significant change in 
inter-agency counterterrorism.  
When a terrorist attack takes place in the United States, the response of many 
members of Congress in the weeks and months afterwards is to criticise the security agencies 
that failed to prevent it. They do not usually acknowledge that the fragmented counterterrorist 
system that they criticise stems from a deep-rooted set of anti-statist institutions of which 
Congress itself is a key component. Rather than simply blaming the agencies, lawmakers and 
citizens would do well to acknowledge more explicitly the uncomfortable trade off between 
avoiding excessively strong government on the one hand and developing effective inter-
agency counterterrorism on the other. 
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